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  • 10

How Not to Fly an Airplane

Soumis
 
One of the most challenging parts of being a pilot can be knowing when to keep a plane out of the sky. (www.theatlantic.com) Plus d'info...

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Highflyer1950
Highflyer1950 3
Not an unusual story, however it was an EA L-1011 in the everglades accident. We've all heard about strong FO's and weak Captains and visa versa. Probably would have saved a lot of anguish if you had just said, " hey skipper, it's below minimums and forecast to stay that way so lets's call it a night and I'll get the first beer.
royalbfh
royalbfh 3
Its stories like this one that really make me miss Preacher1...
jshhmr
josh homer 3
It's imperative that behind the scenes OPS listen to their pilots. As a former crew scheduler, our phone lines were recorded. There were a couple times that I had a flight canceled when the captain hinted of fatigue. I wasn't about to live with the consequences of what could've happened.
atlwatchdog
Watch Dog 3
"From the colorful radar screen, with its reds and yellows, and the greenish color of more clouds to the west, I knew we were not going to beat the squall line."

-And yet you didn't turn the plane around and make the safe decision to discontinue the flight.

"When the lightning hit us, the two computer screens in front of me—the screens containing all the flight information, including airspeed, altitude, and navigation—went black. I had to use a few small and awkwardly located backup instruments to fly the plane."

-You telling us that the Saab 340 you were flying had more than the standard 6-pack with 2-tube EFIS? Good job selling drama. How about being truthful? You may have lost your EADI and EHSI, but still had altitude, airspeed and vertical indicators, plus your RMI.

This story sounds a lot like "Look how great I am!"

I also agree with 30west. You're sprouting off about how you taught CRM, but yet you failed to invoke the CRM process by not being direct about the weather at the destination.

I sure hope the author hasn't taken this same approach into her current job teaching new pilots at Daniel Webster College in Nashua, NH.

But, she readily makes herself available to the press to give "tantalizing" details and comments about aviation news items to the media.. :/
30west
30west 3
There was a lapse in CRM in the below landing mins scenario that was described in the article by the author, a former CRM instructor. The lapse was in EFFECTIVE communication, leaving out the most important part of the information that needed to be communicated.....that the destination was below minimums and forecast to remain so. Talking "around" the issue as in the example and not addressing the causal reason for the need to do/not do something is never good in any communications, be it in the cockpit, ops or non-aviation situations.
patpylot
patrick baker 1
the eastern l-1011 was a case of nobody flying the airplane whilst dealing with the distraction of landing gear green light indicators. the autopilot was disconnected without the crew noticing, and they proceeded to have the plane fly itself into the swamps outside Miami. The trust in the autopilot maintaining altitude was misplaced then and still happens .I miss the preacher too, for he would have correct words here for us all.

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