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Boeing Sees No Business Case For 757 MAX
Whatever else Boeing may be discussing with potential customers at this year’s International Society of Transport Aircraft Trading (Istat) meeting regarding options for replacing the 757, we now at least know it will not be talking about bringing the original aircraft back to life with new engines. (aviationweek.com) More...
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Many of us lament the passing of the 757 and read it a stupid decision by Boeing. As the newest one out the is about 10-11 years old, those in the desert are probably just at the end of the road, time wise, rather than usused. It really doesn't matter. Airbus has 10 years head start on the type and if Boeing started today, would be a minimum of 5 getting something in the air. Whatever they bring out will probably not look or perform anything like the 57 did. She was a pilot's machine.
Maybe it wasn't a great decision in retrospect, given that a re-engined 757 would basically be a direct (and probably pretty strong) competitor with the A321neoLR at a pretty low cost, but the reality is that a lot of the developments with the 757 being pushed into the transatlantic market actually happened after the production lines closed in 2005.
Remember, from 2002 to 2005 Boeing received a total of 7 orders. At the time, the decision, though unfortunate, was a smart business decision. The US and European airline markets were depressed and looking for smaller planes. Boeing had no way of knowing that fuel prices would skyrocket in 2007-2008, that airlines would then equip their 757's with blended winglets, and then realize they could put in enough seats to still make money on transatlantic routes, thereby creating a new market for the planes to give them an extra 5-10 extra years of service life. Boeing figured that around now, most 757's would be out in the Mojave.
Yes, in hindsight it seems like a bad decision, but that's the way things go. And in fairness, Boeing had been working on the assumption that some airlines would use a shortened 787 variant as a 757 replacement and would make requests for one.
Remember, from 2002 to 2005 Boeing received a total of 7 orders. At the time, the decision, though unfortunate, was a smart business decision. The US and European airline markets were depressed and looking for smaller planes. Boeing had no way of knowing that fuel prices would skyrocket in 2007-2008, that airlines would then equip their 757's with blended winglets, and then realize they could put in enough seats to still make money on transatlantic routes, thereby creating a new market for the planes to give them an extra 5-10 extra years of service life. Boeing figured that around now, most 757's would be out in the Mojave.
Yes, in hindsight it seems like a bad decision, but that's the way things go. And in fairness, Boeing had been working on the assumption that some airlines would use a shortened 787 variant as a 757 replacement and would make requests for one.
Problem is that nobody gives a tinkers damn anymore as to what something looks like or how it performs and I am not speaking in economies there, I am talking about how it PERFORMS. Sad part is also that neither one of those things will add a nickel to the revenue generated on a run from A to B, but Boeing is gonna have a big step to make if they were to follow the 757 with something. There is nothing to surpass pilot's pride when you go down the taxiway in that high steppin' lady. Anything less in the looks department and you have just another airplane.
Oh, I totally agree the 757 is a great plane. What I'm also saying is that it didn't make business sense for Boeing to keep making them in 2005. We can lament that the free market puts little value on things that don't directly contribute to the bottom line (there is a loose link to pilot morale here, but it's not really quantifiable and it definitely doesn't have a measurable impact on cost/revenue).
If we don't like how the market does things, the alternative is something that isn't the market. Now, setting up a state-run system for the sole purpose of supporting good-looking airliners that are pilot-friendly isn't exactly the most dangerous example of government interference in the market, but most free-market types would say that the government would get it wrong.
If we don't like how the market does things, the alternative is something that isn't the market. Now, setting up a state-run system for the sole purpose of supporting good-looking airliners that are pilot-friendly isn't exactly the most dangerous example of government interference in the market, but most free-market types would say that the government would get it wrong.
I think we're in agreement from what we have both written.
Government could screw up a steelie ball with a wooden mallet in the middle of a 40 acre field. Just look at our current USAF and it's beloved F35 hunk of junk.
Ending the 757 production lines made short-term sense in 2005. It did not make long-term sense when looking at where the airline market would be in 10 years, but it did make sense based on where it was in 2005. Boeing had poor leadership at the time.
Strong-willed and visionary leadership (or the lack thereof) has impacts; consider that when Boeing closed down the 757 lines in 2005, they had 4 CEOs in under 3 years (Condit resigned in 2003, was succeeded by Stonecipher, who resigned in 2005 and was replaced first by James Bell as acting CEO and then later in 2005 by Jim McNerney). It's hard to have a company think about what the market will look like in 10 years if the leadership can't even think beyond the next 10 months.
I'm in grad school to be a city planner; I'm going to be working for the government, so I do obviously have some level of bias there, but I will say that this isn't about government vs. private sector, this is about good leadership vs. poor leadership. The government is just as capable of having great, long-term visionary figures as the private sector, as well as having the kind of morons who cancel the 757 because orders declined post-9/11 even though the program as a whole was still profitable.
Strong-willed and visionary leadership (or the lack thereof) has impacts; consider that when Boeing closed down the 757 lines in 2005, they had 4 CEOs in under 3 years (Condit resigned in 2003, was succeeded by Stonecipher, who resigned in 2005 and was replaced first by James Bell as acting CEO and then later in 2005 by Jim McNerney). It's hard to have a company think about what the market will look like in 10 years if the leadership can't even think beyond the next 10 months.
I'm in grad school to be a city planner; I'm going to be working for the government, so I do obviously have some level of bias there, but I will say that this isn't about government vs. private sector, this is about good leadership vs. poor leadership. The government is just as capable of having great, long-term visionary figures as the private sector, as well as having the kind of morons who cancel the 757 because orders declined post-9/11 even though the program as a whole was still profitable.
Well, McNerney has been there about 7 years now and has hit 65, mandatory retirement. Wonder who will take his place
Isn't mandatory retirement only a thing for pilots? Does Boeing have some policy on this?
Boeing has it too. I saw it published somewhere the other day with that same question under it.
I have an old military buddy who still works at Boeing on the 777 program in Everett. He just turned 70. He is a hard worker who loves to work and not sure when he will retire.
It is primarily for executives but is regularly waived if he wants to continue. He has put Mullenberg & Conner in place behind him so there will be an orderly transition when he does retire
That makes sense, he belongs (begrudgingly) to the union. He works in the Weight-on-Wheels group.
